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Abstract:	This study introduces a comprehensive stage-wise decision framework to support resilience 
planning for roadway networks regarding pre-disaster mitigation (Stage I), post-disaster emergency 
response (Stage II) and long-term recovery (Stage III).  Three decision metrics are first defined, each based 
on a derivation of the number of independent pathways (IPW) within a roadway system, to measure the 
performance of a network in term of its robustness, redundancy, and recoverability, respectively.   Using 
the three IPW-based decision metrics, a stage-wise decision process is then formulated as a stochastic multi-
objective optimization problem, which includes a project ranking mechanism to identify pre-disaster 
network retrofit projects in Phase I, a prioritization approach for temporary repairs to facilitate immediate 
post-disaster emergency responses in Phase II, and a methodology for scheduling network-wide repairs 
during the long-term recovery of the roadway system in Phase III.  Finally, this stage-wise decision 
framework is applied to the roadway network of Shelby County, TN, USA subjected to seismic hazards,  to 
illustrate its implementation in supporting community network resilience planning.     
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
The economy and social well-being of a community heavily rely on the availability and functionality and 
of its critical infrastructure systems, including power, water, gas, and transportation (PCCIP, 1997).  
Roadway networks are a fundamental component of transportation systems and, in the event of an extreme 
hazard, play a critical role during and after the event.  For example, prior to the landfall of a hurricane, 
roadways are crucial for population evacuation; during a flood event, available roadways may provide key 
means of rescue; and during the longer-term recovery, the accessibility of schools, businesses, centers of 
government and commerce, etc. are significant elements of the economic recovery and social well-being of 
a community. However, the components of a roadway network, i.e. roads and bridges, are directly 
vulnerable to extreme hazard events; for instance, the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 damaged 1,657 bridges 
in China (Zhuang et al., 2009); Hurricane Irene in 2011 affected over 500 miles of highways, 2,000 miles 
of roadways, and 300 hundred bridges in Vermont (Lunderville, 2011). Such physical damage can lead to 
extensive and expensive functionality losses to the impacted community. For example, Hurricane Sandy in 
2012 caused $7.5 billion damage in direct damage to the New York transportation infrastructure (WABC-
TV/DT, 2012), which have not included the indirect loss of lives, commerce, or other losses associated with 
the inability to effectively access emergency facilities or services, to route repair crews, or provide access 
to places of business. Enhancing transportation network resilience to these natural hazards has become a 
national imperative (Newman et al., 2011). 
 
	
	
Figure 1: Illustration of resilience concept [Source:  Zhang et al. (2017)] 
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Resilience - defined as the ability of social units (e.g., organizations, communities) to mitigate hazards, 
contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimize 
social disruption and mitigate the effects of future hazards - can be measured, as shown in Figure 1, by four 
major attributes: robustness (ability to withstand extreme events), rapidity (speed of recovering from 
impacts of extreme events), redundancy (alternative or backup components within the system), and 
resourcefulness (availability of emergency resources to respond to disasters) (Bruneau et al., 2003). A 
notable growing body of literature has been published to evaluate the performance of transportation systems 
from the perspective of network resilience to natural hazards (Chang and Nojima, 2001; Murray-Tuite, 
2006; Ta et al., 2009; Cox et al., 2011; Frangopol and Bocchini, 2011; Ip and Wang, 2011; Cetinkaya  et 
al., 2015; Gillen & Hasheminia 2016; Zhang and Wang, 2016; Zhang et al., 2017a, 2017b, 2018; Zhang 
and Nicholson, 2016a).  Research studies have recently extended to decision formulations regarding risk 
mitigation, response and recovery of roadway networks at a community or regional scale.  Bell et al. (2008) 
used travel time reliability as the network performance indicator to study the transportation vulnerability 
under terrorist attacks, in which decisions regarding the path used in the road network were made to 
minimize the maximum of expected loss from a predefined disruption.  Bell et al. (2017) proposed capacity 
weighted spectral partitioning to identify the bottleneck of transportation network, which does not require 
information of origin-destination matrix and path assignment.  Chang et al. (2010) developed a decision 
method for post-disaster evacuation using a proposed transportation simulation model which was capable 
of capturing the change of traffic pattern following seismic events. Miller-Hooks et al. (2011) proposed a 
two-stage stochastic programming model to maximize transportation network resilience, defined as the 
expected traffic demand supplied following a disastrous event, by enhancing pre-disaster preparedness and 
optimizing post-disaster scheduling.  This model was later extended in Faturechi and Miller-Hooks (2014) 
to a three-stage, bi-level stochastic mathematical program, in which the upper-level is a sequence of actions 
for both pre-disaster mitigation and post-disaster restoration, and the lower-level reconstructs the routine 
for affected users using partial user equilibrium model.   Sheu (2014) presented a survivor perception–
attitude–resilience conceptual model with the focus on maximizing the survivor resilience after disaster.  
Sheu and Pan (2014) integrated three sub-networks (shelter network, medical network, and distribution 
network) to build a seamless centralized emergency supply network in response to natural disasters.  Zhang 
et al. (2017) optimized roadway network recovery from an earthquake event by incorporating network 
topology, redundancy, traffic flow, damage states and available resources into a stochastic decision 
processes, resulting in an optimal schedule for sequencing restoration interventions for all damaged bridges, 
which lead to the fastest (in terms of time) and most efficient (in terms of indirect loss) network recovery 
process.   
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Reviewing these studies has revealed the following:  i) most research studies only investigated the decision 
formulation or process at one point in time with respect to the occurrence of a hazard, and ii) different 
studies selected different network performance metrics as the basis for their decisions at hand.  It has 
become apparent that the time at which a decision is made (with respect to the hazard occurrence) 
determines the situation (or constraints) and purpose (or objectives) of the decision process.  It is therefore 
necessary for a decision framework to reflect these dynamic perspectives across the different stages of 
resilience planning through carefully defined performance metrics, interventions, objectives and constraints. 
There is an increasing need for a consistent methodology to support stage-wise resilience planning of 
roadway networks as more and more communities are beginning to incorporate resilience as a concept in 
their day-to-day risk management practices.   
2. Stage-wise Decision Framework 
The resilience concept, as illustrated in Figure 1, clearly has a time dimension. On one hand, risk mitigation 
and disaster management interventions at different points in time with respect to the occurrence of hazard 
are very different, necessitating different decision support (NIST, 2016). On the other hand, these decisions, 
although made at different planning stages, should serve the same overarching goal of enhancing network 
resilience in a systematic fashion.  We propose a stage-wise decision framework, as illustrated in Figure 2, 
to support resilience planning of the transportation network in three phases: Stage I – pre-disaster 
mitigation; Stage II – post-disaster emergency response; and Stage III – long-term recovery; i.e.:     
 
• Stage I refers to the mitigation planning stage prior to a disaster. An often-used mitigation strategy for 
roadway networks is to retrofit network components (i.e. bridge and roads), with an objective of 
enhancing network robustness (cf. Figure 1) and subsequently reducing damage and functionality loss 
of the network when a hazard event occurs.  This pre-event mitigation decision problem concerns how 
many and which network components should be selected for retrofit subject to the available finances 
and other resource limitations. We propose, for Stage I, a prioritization mechanism for retrofit 
interventions that maximizes the network robustness under budget constraints.   
• Stage II refers to the chaotic emergency response stage during or shortly after the occurrence of a hazard 
event.  The primary functionality of a roadway network in Stage II is to connect affected population to 
critical facilities, e.g. hospitals, fire stations, police stations, etc., and to provide routes enabling repair 
crews to access damaged components of utility (e.g. power and water) networks.  This functionality 
requirement in Stage II is often resumed through rapid repairing or establishing temporary pathways 
under time pressure. We therefore present a decision method to identify the damaged network 
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components for rapid repair that can resume, within the shortest time frame, the connectivity between 
the O-D pairs that are critical for life rescue.   
• Stage III refers to the long-term recovery phase, in which the impaired network is gradually restored to 
its pre-disaster functionality level through repair interventions.   The recovery time of the network is 
the time it takes to repair or reconstruct all the damaged roads and bridges, which is governed by the 
availability of construction resources (i.e. funding, contractors, construction materials, etc.) and how 
they are distributed spatially along the time steps of the recovery phase. For Stage III, we propose a 
scheduling approach to sequence the repair interventions constrained by the characteristic of resource 
availability in order to resume network functionality efficiency with the most desirable recovery 
trajectory and the shortest recovery time.   
 
The proposed stage-wise decision framework includes two major components: 1) a stage-wise network 
metric (SWM) system, that is formulated to be compatible with the unique objectives of the specific 
decisions in each of the planning stages; and 2) a stage-wise formulation of the decisions (SWD), using the 
SWM system as the network performance indicators in different planning stages as the basis for decision-
making. The formulations of SWM and SWD are discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.  
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Figure 2: Illustration of the stage-wise decision framework 
3. Stage-wise Network Performance Metric (SWM) System 
Different objectives of different planning phases require different network performance metrics, and 
different choices of metrics used in a decision formulation will ultimately result in different decisions.  
Cutter et al. (2008) emphasized that the most important criteria for metric selection is validity, which speaks 
to the question of whether the metric is representative of the resilience dimension or the decision of interest. 
General-purpose network performance metrics, either topology-based or functionality-based, usually 
cannot appropriately reflect the specific objectives of the decisions in each of the resilience planning stages. 
In particular, topology-based metrics (e.g. connectivity, density, etc.) alone do not reflect network 
functionality requirements which often are the focuses of resilience-based decisions; on the other hand, 
functionality-based metrics (e.g. travel cost, maximum traffic capacity) ordinarily require “too much” 
information (e.g. pre- and post-event network supply-demand at different spatial and temporal resolution), 
which may not be readily available and, more importantly, may not be directly relevant or representative 
of the specific objectives of the decisions to be made. That is, a metric that incorporates “too much” 
information could lose its sensitivity as a performance indicator to a specific dimension of network 
performance that is directly relevant to the current decision.  To best support the stage-wise resilience 
planning of roadway networks, we first develop a stage-wise network performance metric (SWM) system 
that includes three metrics all based on the concept of independent pathways (IPW): reliability-weighted 
IPW (RIPW), emergency facility-weighted IPW (EIPW), and daily traffic-weighted IPW (TIPW), to 
support decisions in Stage I, II and III, respectively.   
 
Edge-independent pathways, i.e. IPW, referred to in the SWM system, is an important concept in network 
science.  The set of all IPW’s in a network is defined as all paths between a two distinct nodes that do not 
share any common edges (e.g., road segments) (Newman, 2010).  IPW provides a measure of network 
redundancy, which is an essential topological feature of roadway networks that strongly and positively 
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correlates to network resiliency as observed in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in California (Ardekani, 
1992).  Recognizing that redundancy in transportation network  enhances resiliency, we employ IPW1 is as 
a common substrate for the SWM system;  and depending on the specific objective of the decisions in each 
stage, the network functionality-specific and component-specific attributes are weighted into the 
formulation of the IPW-based SWM system, as presented next.  
 
We describe a transportation network on a directed graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐴) where 𝑉 = {1,2, … , 𝑛} is the set of 
nodes and 𝐴 = {1,2, … ,𝑚} is the set of edges that represent road segments without or with maximum of 
one bridge2 .  The set 𝑉  is partitioned into two mutually exclusive sets 𝐸 = {1,2, … , 𝑒}  comprised of 
emergency nodes (representing critical facilities, e.g., fire stations and hospitals) and 𝑁 = {𝑒 + 1, 𝑒 +2, … , 𝑛} of non-emergency nodes (representing major destinations, e.g., residential areas, economic hubs, 
and major road intersections). Let 𝐾45 and 𝑃457 , respectively, denote the total number of IPWs and the 𝑘th 
IPW between node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉. Each IPW is a set of ordered edges connected in series. An algorithm 
for computing	𝐾45 and searching for 𝑃457  between all node pairs can be found in Zhang and Wang (2016).  
Let 𝐼𝑃𝑊4 denote the average number of IPWs between node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 and all the other 𝑛 − 1 nodes, i.e., 
 𝐼𝑃𝑊4 = 1𝑛 − 1 𝐾45@AB5CB  (1) 
The IPW of network 𝐺 is defined as the overall average of all 𝐼𝑃𝑊4  values for every node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉,   
 𝐼𝑃𝑊 𝐺 = 1𝑛 𝐼𝑃𝑊4@4CB  (2) 
Note that IPW is independent of traveler behavior and origin-destination (O-D) demand values and can be 
computed efficiently using either Dijkstra’s algorithm or the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm for max flows 
(Ahuja et al. 1993).   
3.1 Reliability Weighted IPW, RIPW 
	
																																																						
1	As a redundancy measure in the context of resilience-based decision for road networks, IPW is preferred to all-possible-pathway 
(APW) for two reasons: (a) finding APW itself is NP-hard (Ausiello et al., 2012), which makes it impractical for real-world 
problems, while IPWs is limited and can be easily enumerated by Dijkstra’s (Skiena, 1990) or the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm (Ahuja 
et al., 1993); and (2) since many paths could share a common edge, APW can be overly sensitive to certain local damages. 
	
2	An edge is a segment that can only have one bridge at most, because decision discussed in this study are made on individual 
bridges, each of which need a unique identity in the network topology representation. For a road with two bridges, it can be easily 
partitioned to two consecutive roads, each of which has one bridge.  
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In Stage I, the purpose of pre-disaster mitigation through component retrofit is to enhance the network 
robustness as discussed in Section 2, i.e. to reduce the network damage when hazard occurs.  Increasing 
reliability (or reducing failure probability) of selected network components to minimize the possible 
damages to the IPWs between all O-D pairs is the objective of retrofit interventions. Accordingly, we define 
reliability-weighted IPW, RIPW, as the network performance metric to support the Stage I pre-event 
mitigation decisions.  Assuming conservatively3 that reliabilities of edges are statistically independent, the 
reliability of path 𝑃457 , denoted as 𝑅457 , is the product of the reliabilities of all edges included in the path 𝑃457   
 𝑅457 = 𝑞FF∈GHIJ  (3) 
where 𝑙 and 𝑞F are the edge index and the corresponding reliability. The average number of reliable IPWs 
for node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 is denoted as 𝑄𝑖𝑅 and calculated as shown in Eq (4): 
 𝑄4M = 1𝑛 − 1 𝑅457NHI7CB
@AB
5CB  (4) 
Let 𝑄M 𝐺  denote the RIPW of network 𝐺 which is computed in Eq (5): 
 𝑄M 𝐺 = 1𝑛 𝑄4M@4CB  (5) 
A critical step to compute RIPW is to quantify reliabilities of the edges (i.e., road segments and bridges), 
which depend on the specific hazard of interest, and often are evaluated through fragility analyses associated 
with damage states of interest [e.g. HAZUS-MH MR4 (2009)].	
3.2 Emergency Node-Weighted IPW, EIPW 
 
In Stage II, immediately after a disruptive event, emergency managers need to quickly identify and establish 
emergency routes to send rescue teams and relief resources to the affected population. The connectivity 
between critical facilities and the people who need to be rescued is of the paramount concern (Jones and 
Bentham, 1995; Higgs, 2004). Accordingly, we define the emergency facility-weighted IPW, EIPW, as the 
network performance metric for Stage II.  EIPW measures the average number of independent pathways 
between emergency nodes and non-emergency nodes. The EIPW is highly dependent on the post-event 
damage condition of the network. Let 𝑑45  denote the damage status of edge 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 , which can be 
																																																						
3 Although this assumption regarding may not hold exactly for natural hazards with large geographic footprints, it is well-known 
from systems reliability theory that this assumption is conservative, especially for bridges that are widely separated in the system. 
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measured on a 0 to 4 scale, corresponding to the damage level of none, slight, moderate, extensive and 
complete, respectively, as termed in HAZUS MH-2.2 (2015).  Edges with the damage conditions of 
extensive or complete are considered unserviceable. The serviceability of edge 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 is denoted 𝑠45 and 
defined as, 
 𝑠45 = 1,							𝑑45 ≤ 2	0, otherwise  (6) 
Eq. (7) defines the serviceability of 𝑃457 , denoted as 𝑠457 , as the product of the serviceability of all road edges 
included in the path 𝑃457 :  
 𝑠457 = 𝑠FF∈GHIJ  (7) 
If 𝑠457  equals 1, the path is serviceable and if it equals 0, it is not.  Let 𝑄4[  denote the EIPW of node:  
 𝑄4[ = 1𝑒 𝑠457NHI7CB5∈[  (8) 
The EIPW of a network is defined as the average EIPW of non-emergency nodes, which is computed as, 
 𝑄[(𝐺) = 1𝑛 − 𝑒 𝑄4[4∈\ 	 (9) 
If 𝑄𝐸(𝐺) equals 0, the transportation network cannot support any emergency actions. 
 
3.3 Average Daily Traffic Weighted IPW, TIPW 
 
In Stage III, we use the pre-event average daily traffic (ADT) weighted IPW, or TIPW, as the network 
performance metric fundamental to decisions. The ADT on roads and bridges are the field measurements 
routinely maintained by the Federal or State Department of Transportation.  ADT data may be more 
accurate than current traffic assignment models at representing real traffic patterns since the path choice of 
travelers are only partially rational, whereas traffic assignment models commonly assume decisions to be 
based on distance or travel time (Yagar, 1971; Patricksson, 1994). We emphasize that we use pre-event 
ADT data as the benchmark for recovery decisions, as the goal in Stage III is to resume the full pre-event 
functionality level of the network through a timely and effective recovery process. The service level of each 
edge 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 is idealized as 1 − ]HI^ .  For example, if an edge is completely damaged, 𝑑45 is set to be 4, 
and the corresponding service level is 0.  The service level of the path 𝑃457  is approximated as the product 
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of the service levels of all arcs 𝑙 ∈ 𝑃457 . Let 𝐴F denote the ADT of edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝑃457 .  Define 𝐴457 , the ADT of 𝑃457 , 
as the minimum ADT of all edges on that pathway, i.e., 
 𝐴457 = min	{𝐴F|𝑙 ∈ 𝑃457} (10) 
The normalized ADT of the path is defined as: 
 𝐴457 = 𝐾45𝐴457𝐴45bNHIbCB  (11) 
Note that for any node pair 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉, 𝐴457NHI7CB = 𝐾45. Let 𝑄4c denote the TIPW of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 and  
 𝑄4d = 1𝑛 − 1 𝐴457 (1 − 𝑑F4 )F∈GHIJ
NHI
7CB
@AB
5CB  (12) 
The TIPW of a network is further defined as: 
 𝑄d(𝐺) = 1𝑛 𝑄4d@4CB  (13) 
For Stage III, a damaged transportation network is considered fully recovered if all the damaged roadway 
segments are restored, i.e., the network TIPW computed using Eq. (13) returns to its pre-disaster level 
(without damaged network components).  
 
The defined SWM – comprised of RIPW, EIPW and TIPW – are tailored and sensitive to the unique 
objectives of the specific decisions they are serving, at the same time, they ensure a level of consistency 
among the decisions in different planning stages. These IPW-based metrics can be employed individually 
to support decisions at each planning stage, or used together as a system in the SWD formulated in Section 
4.   
4. Formulation of the Stage-wise Decision (SWD) Framework  
4.1 Stage I: Pre-disaster Risk Mitigation 
	
At Stage I, the decision is to make selections from a set of candidate edges to maximize the RIPW and 
simultaneously minimize the related investment cost. The mitigation decisions, represented as the binary 
decision vector 𝒙, is comprised of a component	𝑥45 for each 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴	as defined as below, 
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 𝑥45 = 1, edge	 𝑖, 𝑗 	is	selected0,																					otherwise , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 (14) 
The first objective of the decision process is to maximize the expected RIPW:  
 max𝑄M(𝒙) = 𝐸op 1𝑛 1𝑛 − 1 [(1 − 𝑥F)𝑞F(𝜉s) + 𝑥F𝑞F′]F∈GHIJ
NHI
7CB
@AB
5CB
@
4CB  (15) 
where 𝑞F(𝜉s) is the realization of the random variables 	𝑞F  representing the reliabilities of edges 𝑙 ∈ 𝑃457  
prior to retrofit, and  𝑞F′ is the reliability of edge after retrofit. Eq. (15) ensures that the reliability of edge 𝑙 is 𝑞F′ if it is selected; otherwise, it does not change. Let 𝐶(𝒙) denote the total cost associated with 
decision	𝒙. The second objective is to minimize the expectation of total retrofit costs: 
 min 𝐶(𝒙) = 𝐸ov 𝑐45(𝜉x)𝑥454,5 ∈c 	 (16) 
where 𝑐45 ξy is the stochastic realization of random variable retrofit cost 𝑐45.  
 
This decision problem is closely related to the stochastic knapsack problem (Ross and Tsang, 1989), but 
further complicated by the procedure of iteratively computing a series of weighted shortest paths. The non-
dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II), successfully applied to several similar problems (Chu 
and Beasley, 1998; Deb et al., 2002), is employed to identify the near-optimal Pareto frontier for this multi-
objective optimization problem in which the two objectives conflict.   We couple NSGA-II with Monte 
Carlo Simulation (MCS) and optimize the expected RIPW and total costs.  
4.2. Stage II: Post-disaster Emergency Response 
	
In this stage, the problem is to select a number of edges from failed edges and to schedule their restoration 
sequence, the objective is to minimize the total time to ensure that there exists at least one path between 
non-emergency nodes and emergency nodes. Let 𝐷 = {1, 2, … , 𝑏}  denote the set of damaged edges 
(candidates). Let 𝑥F and 𝑦F respectively denote whether or not to select edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 and the time at which 
emergency restoration is initiated for edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷. The network emergency recovery time associated with 
the selection 𝒙 and schedule 𝒚 is denoted as 𝑡[ 𝒙, 𝒚 . Let 𝑠F′ and 𝑝F(𝜉b) denote serviceability for each 
edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 after emergency restoration and the stochastic variables of duration of temporal action. Let 𝑇 
denote the set of discrete points in time:	{𝑡} {𝑡B, … , 𝑡} which is the union of initial time 𝑡  and the 
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intervention completion times 𝑡F = 𝑥F 𝑦F + 𝑝F(𝜉b)  for each edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 . Using the above notation, the 
emergency accessibility recovery model is presented as follows: 
 
 min 𝑡[ 𝒙, 𝒚 = 𝐸o maxF∈ 𝑥F 𝑦F + 𝑝F 𝜉b − 𝑡  (17) 
subject to: 
 𝑠F′F∈GHIJ
NHI
7CB5∈[ ≥ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (18) 
 𝑠F′ = 1 − 𝑥F 𝑠F + 𝑥F, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 (19) 
 𝑡 ≥ 𝑦F [𝑡 ≤ 𝑦F + 𝑝F 𝜉b ]F∈ ≤ 𝑁, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (20) 
 𝑦F ≤ 𝑀𝑥F, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 (21) 
 𝑠F′, 𝑥F ∈ 0,1 , ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 (22) 
 𝑦F ≥ 0, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 (23) 
Eq. (17) defines the total emergency accessibility recovery time as the intervention completion time of the 
very last scheduled edge. Eq. (18) requires each non-emergency node to have at least one IPW to an 
emergency node and Eq. (19) ensures the edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 remains at its initial serviceability unless it is selected 
for restoration. In Eq. (20), [𝑃] is the Iverson bracket, which returns 1 if 𝑃 is true, and 0 otherwise. 𝑁 
denotes the maximum number of simultaneous emergency restoration interventions possible based on the  
the human and financial resources available in the community for emergency recovery during this stage. 
The parameter 𝑀 in Eq. (21) is set to a large number and is used to ensure edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 is scheduled for 
restoration only if it is selected. Note that 𝑀 must be a sufficiently large number (e.g., greater than any 
reasonable scheduling times) to not unintentionally reduce the set of feasible solutions.  
 
The problem under investigation is closely related to the NP-hard parallel machine selection and scheduling 
problem (Cheng and Gen, 1997; Subramaniam et al., 2000; Cao et al., 2005). We assume bridge repair 
scheduling is non-preemptive, that is, once a crew has begun repair on a given bridge, they must complete 
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their work before moving to another bridge. A genetic algorithm (GA) is employed to identify the near-
optimal solutions for the emergency accessibility recovery problem.   
4.3 Stage III: Long-term Recovery 
	
In the final stage, the objective is to restore the transportation system to the pre-disaster condition with 
minimized total recovery time and maximized efficiency. This paper utilizes two criteria to evaluate the 
rapidity and efficiency of the long-term recovery scheduling: total recovery time (TRT) and the skewness 
of the recovery trajectory (SRT), which are recently introduced by Zhang et al. (2017). It must be noted 
that the emergency restoration in Stage II is only associated with temporary interventions – that is, any 
bridge selected in Stage II, has not been repaired for long-term use and must be considered in Stage III. The 
long-term recovery problem then is to determine an optimal schedule 𝒙 = {𝑥B, 𝑥, … , 𝑥} for the repair of 
all 𝑏 damaged edges. Let 𝑟F(𝜉b) denote the realization of the random variable 𝑟F denoting the duration of 
the restoration intervention on bridge 𝑙. Let 𝑡M(𝒙) and 𝑡(𝒙) denote the TRT and SRT associated with 
schedule 𝒙 , respectively. We set 𝑇′ = {𝑡′, 𝑡B′, … , 𝑡′}  as the permutation of 𝑇  such that 𝑡′ ≤ 𝑡B′ ≤𝑡′ ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑡′. The long-term recovery model is presented as below: 
 
 min 𝑡M(𝒙) =𝐸o maxF∈ 𝑥F + 𝑟F 𝜉b − 𝑡  (24) 
 min 𝑡(𝒙) = 𝐸o 𝑡𝑖′𝑢𝑖=1 𝑄𝑡𝑖′𝐴 (𝑡𝑖′ − 𝑡𝑖−1′ )𝑄𝑡𝑖′𝐴 (𝑡𝑖′ − 𝑡𝑖−1′ )𝑑𝑖=1  
(25) 
subject to: 
 𝑄c = 1𝑛 1𝑛 − 1 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑘 (1 − 𝑑𝑙𝑡4 )𝑙∈𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝐾𝑖𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑛−1
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇′ (26) 
 𝑑F = 𝑑F 𝑥F + 𝑝F 𝜉b > 𝑡 , ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇′ (27) 
 𝑡 ≥ 𝑥F [𝑡 ≤ 𝑥F + 𝑝F 𝜉b ]F∈ ≤ 𝑁, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇′ (28) 
 𝑥F ≥ 0, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐷 (29) 
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As discussed in Section 4.1, we use NSGA-II to search the near-optimal non-dominated solutions for the 
multi-objective stochastic integer-programming problem. In addition, there are other techniques can be used 
to solve this problem (Nicholson and Zhang, 2016; Zhang and Nicholson, 2016b, 2018). 
5. Stage-wise Resilience Planning for Roadway Network in Shelby County, TN  
	
The proposed SWD framework is illustrated using a skeleton highway network in the Shelby County, 
Tennessee, illustrated in Figure 3. The system includes 46 edges representing the highways and 34 nodes 
representing major road intersections and economic hubs; there are 10 hospitals in the study area, 8 of 
which are located in downtown. There are 24 bridges are considered in this skeleton network, and the 
detailed descriptions of those bridges are presented in Table 1. For simplicity, we only consider bridges as 
the vulnerable network components in the subsequent illustration.  
 
The chance of a moderate earthquake occurring in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) in the near future 
is high.  Scientists estimate that the probability of a magnitude 6 to 7 earthquake occurring in NMSZ within 
the next 50 years is higher than 90% (Hildenbrand et al. 1996). However, most civil infrastructure in the 
NMSZ were not seismically designed, as opposed to those in frequent earthquake regions (e.g., California, 
USA or Japan). We consider a scenario earthquake with magnitude Mw equal to 7.7 and the epicenter 
located at 35.3N and 90.3W (on the New Madrid Fault Line) as proposed in the MAE Center study (Adachi, 
2007).  A selected ground motion attenuation model (Atkinson and Boore, 1995) is used to estimate the 
peak ground acceleration at the site of the bridges.   
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Figure 3: (a) Road network in Shelby County, TN.  (b) Detailed network topology in downtown 
Memphis, TN.  [The plotting area in (b) is highlighted by the dash-line box in (a)]  
	
	
The random variables, including ADT (𝐴45), pre-disaster retrofit costs (𝑐45) (assumed to be a function of 
bridge geometry, material type, year built, and deck area), reliabilities (𝑞45) , expected damage (𝑑45) and the 
corresponding restoration duration (𝑝45), for each of the bridges under the considered earthquake scenario, 
are assume to be normal distributions, with mean values listed in Table 1 and an assumed coefficient of 
variation of 7% (the implication of this assumption, often made in probabilistic risk analysis, is that the 
parameters of each bridge in this network can be estimated to within ± 15% with more than 95% confidence).   
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Table 1: Mean values of bridge parameters 
Bridge 
ID 
Construction  
Type 
Deck area 
(m2) Reliability Retrofit Cost ADT 
Damage 
Status 
Duration of 
Restoration  
Intervention 
(Days) 
196 MSSS_Concrete  19,248  0.774  $30,796   21,500  slight 2 
201 MSSS_Concrete  21,792  0.786  $49,031   79,910  slight 4 
231 MSSS_Concrete  21,648  0.781  $48,708   113,830  slight 4 
251 MSC_Concrete  24,000  0.740  $28,799   94,920  slight 4 
264 MSC_Concrete  41,424  0.793  $49,708   94,130  none 0 
267 MSSS_Steel  3,792  0.781  $6,067   99,190  none 0 
282 SS_Concrete  14,640  0.962  $58,561   121,570  none 0 
294 MSC_Concrete  35,280  0.887  $141,115   13,260  extensive 82 
308 MSC_Concrete  36,000  0.712  $143,994   28,220  moderate 24 
345 MSC_Steel  76,224  0.408  $121,956   84,090  extensive 108 
350 MSSS_Steel  74,928  0.638  $89,911   13,770  slight 8 
383 MSC_Concrete  24,432  0.716  $54,971   13,490  moderate 21 
390 MSC_Steel  48,864  0.347  $78,180   2,040  complete 287 
419 MSC_Concrete  19,920  0.745  $79,675   99,000  complete 214 
456 MSC_Concrete  31,296  0.841  $125,180   39,110  moderate 22 
467 MSSS_Concrete  36,864  0.900  $44,236   6,450  slight 6 
475 MSSS_Concrete  6,072  0.779  $24,289   14,580  extensive 67 
507 MSSS_Steel  61,152  0.519  $97,841   11,320  extensive 95 
515 MSC_Steel  42,288  0.280  $50,744   16,890  complete 267 
544 MSSS_Concrete  19,536  0.835  $23,443   7,770  none 0 
551 MSC_Steel  55,008  0.336  $123,765   14,020  extensive 83 
574 MSSS_Concrete  8,640  0.905  $19,439   31,660  moderate 14 
617 MSSS_Concrete  16,248  0.855  $25,996   16,320  slight 2 
666 MSC_Steel  76,512  0.482  $306,042   49,190  none 0 
	 *MSSS – multi span simply supported; MSC- multi span continuous; SS-single span	
	
Stage I: Mitigation Strategy 
	
When all the bridges in the network are subjected to standard traffic flow (the reliabilities of bridges under 
service loads are assumed to be 0.99), the RIPW is 1.697, meaning on average there are 1.697 reliable 
independent pathways (IPW) between all O-D pairs in the network under normal operational condition. 
When the prescribed scenario earthquake is considered, the mean network RIPW drops to 0.635, indicating 
many O-D pairs become disconnected following the earthquake event.  Figure 4 shows the Pareto front of 
the optimal retrofit strategies mapped in the objective space with each triangular marker representing a non-
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dominated solution with respect to a specific combination of financial investment and corresponding RIPW; 
these non-dominated solution cannot be improved with respect to one objective function without 
diminishing the other.  
 
The specifics of the four strategies on the Pareto front, highlighted in Figure 4, are summarized in  
Table 2. For example, Strategy I in Figure 4 is located toward the bottom left of the objective space and 
emphasizes cost savings over RIPW.  This strategy identified three bridges (bridges 196, 390, and 515) for 
retrofit which are located near the center of the roadway system and likely are included in IPWs for several 
O-D pairs. Furthermore, bridges 390 and 515 (cf. Table 1) are among the bridges with lowest reliability but 
their retrofit costs are relatively moderate.  Strategy II moves toward spending more money to improve 
RIPW and indicates that with a budget of $447K, 9 bridges can be retrofitted, leading to a RIPW of 1.00.  
The significance of a RIPW equal to or greater than 1 is that on average at least one reliable pathway exists 
between all O-D pairs. The RIPW increases for solutions along the Pareto front as we move towards the 
upper right of the objective space.  As costs increase, more bridges can be selected for retrofit.  However, 
the tradeoff between RIPW and retrofit cost is not simply one of adding more bridges.  For instance, bridge 
196 is selected in Strategy I, but de-selected in Strategy II and III because neighboring bridges (bridges 345 
and 350) are more cost-effective for improving the overall network RIPW; this Bridge 196 is re-selected 
again in Strategy IV when the retrofit budget become sufficiently high.  Additionally, some bridges are 
always selected in the optimal retrofit solutions, e.g., bridges 390 and 515, often because their reliability is 
much lower than average, or they are shared by IPWs between multiple O-D pairs.  
	
	
Figure 4: Pareto front: RIPW and Cost 
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Table 2: Details of four optimal solutions in Pareto front 
Strategy Expected
cost ($) 
Expected 
RIPW 
Number of bridges 
selected for retrofit 
Bridges selected 
I 160K 0.82 3 196, 390, 515 
II 447K 1.00 9 
267, 350, 383, 390, 475, 507, 515, 574, 
617 
III 831K 1.23 12 
267, 282, 308, 345, 383, 390, 467, 475, 
507, 515,  551, 617 
IV 1,329K 1.46 20 
196, 201, 231, 251, 264, 267, 282,  
308, 345, 350, 383, 390, 419, 456,  
467,  475, 507,  515, 544, 551 
 
Stage II: Emergency Response 
 
The actual damage condition of the network immediately following a hazard event should serve as the 
initial state for the Stage II planning. For illustration, we use the mean damage states tabulated in Table 1 
as the starting point. As shown in Figure 5, following the scenario earthquake, among the 24 bridges, 5 
bridges sustained negligible damage, 7 bridges are slightly damaged, 4 bridges have moderate damage, 5 
bridges suffered extensive damage, and 3 bridges fail completely.  Prior to the scenario earthquake the 
EIPW is 1.89, however, immediately after it falls to 0.55. In particular, nodes 11, 13, and 19 (highlighted 
in Figure 5), do not have access to any hospital in the Shelby area. We assume that the time to establish a 
temporary path is on average 20 hours and 35 hours for extensively and completely damaged bridges, 
respectively, with COV of 10%.  Furthermore, we assume a maximum of two repair teams (i.e. 𝑁 =2) are available for emergency rescue immediately following the disaster.  Our decision space is to schedule 
the rapid repair for the 8 severely damaged bridges in order to restore the EIPW between all non-emergency 
nodes and hospitals from 0.55 to a value that is greater than or equal to 1.0 as quickly as possible.  
 
Error! Reference source not found. reveals the best emergency recovery time defined by Eq. (17) at each 
iteration of the genetic algorithm. The GA converges at the 16th iteration with an emergency recovery time 
of 20 hours. The optimal solution identifies that the bridge 345 is the most critical bridge to bring the EIPW 
of nodes 11, 13, and 19 up to 1.0 within the shortest time. These three nodes can all use bridge 345 (after 
emergency restoration) and 264 (with only negligible damage) to access hospitals. While bridge 390 is an 
alternative candidate (to bridge 345), it is completely damaged and will take longer for emergency 
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restoration. The illustrated approach provides useful information for emergency managers to make 
informed decisions for timely response and relief efforts.  
 
 
	
Figure 5: Damage condition of the roadway network 
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Figure 6: Emergency recovery time over GA iterations 
 
Stage III: Long-term Recovery Scheduling  
	
The network performance in Stage III is evaluated using TIPW as the performance metric defined by Eq. 
(13).  The TIPW equals 0.578 following the earthquake event, while the pre-hazard TIPW is 1.752 under 
normal traffic conditions. The decision problem is to determine the restoration schedule for all the 19 
damaged bridges (including slight, moderate, extensive, and complete damage states) to minimize the TRT 
and SRT. We assume limited resources are available and only a maximum of 5 bridges can be repaired 
simultaneously.   
 
The optimal recovery trajectories are depicted in Figure 7. The optimal solution is clearly superior to the 
suboptimal solution shown, even though they both have the same total recovery time. For example, the 
optimal solution takes 88 days to improve the TIPW to 1.0, while it takes 178 days for the suboptimal 
solution to achieve the same results. This confirms that TRT, if it is used as the sole objective, is not 
sufficient to ensure the recovery schedule with the “best” trajectory. The restoration schedule corresponding 
to the optimal solution is detailed in Figure 8.  The complete network recovery occurs in 300 days given 
that the maximum of 5 bridges can be repaired simultaneously. The optimal strategy selects in the early 
phase 8 slight or moderately damaged bridges associated with large traffic flow (e.g., the ADT of bridge 
231 is 113K). The restoration of these 8 bridges improves the network TIPW by 34% in 34 days as displayed 
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in Figure 7.  Bridge 390 (which takes 287 days to restore) and the other two completely damaged bridges 
(515 and 419) are scheduled early along the time horizon to ensure total recovery time is minimized. These 
results demonstrate that the optimal scheduling of bridge restoration can greatly improve the efficiency of 
the transportation network recovery. Although reasonable strategies can be developed by empirical analysis, 
the advantage of the proposed model would become more apparent when dealing with large, extensively-
damaged networks where the decision variables, possible alternative strategies and constraints create a 
complex decision problem where intuition may fail.  
	
Figure 7: Recovery trajectories with different restoration schedules	
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Figure 8:  The optimal scheduling for long-term recovery of the network  
	
6. Conclusions 
As more and more communities are incorporating resilience as key concept in their day-to-day practices, 
public decision makers and other stakeholders are likely to be required to take a system perspective 
concerning physical infrastructure risk management. To that end, this paper formulates a comprehensive 
stage-wise decision framework to support the resilience planning activities for roadway network in the three 
main stages: pre-disaster mitigation (Stage I), post-disaster emergency response (Stage II), and long-term 
recovery (Stage III). The decision framework includes an IPW-based SWM system and a set of stochastic 
SWD formulations that are designed to meet the specific objectives and decision purposes of each of the 
planning phases. Specifically: 
• Three quantitative resilience-based, decision-specific network performance metrics: RIPW, EIPW 
and TIPW are proposed.  RIPW is formulated to measure the network robustness to extreme natural 
hazards. EIPW is designed to quantify the critical facility accessibility in damaged roadway 
networks. TIPW represents the efficacy of the network in carrying traffic flow.  These specifically 
defined SWMs are used in formulating the specific objectives of the decisions in each of the 
planning phases.  
• Three stochastic optimization models are formulated to support decisions in each planning stage. 
In Stage I, we develop a multi-objective stochastic binary integer programming problem to select 
bridges for retrofit with minimized total cost and maximized RIPW. In Stage II, we employ a 
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stochastic integer programming problem to select and schedule emergency restoration (temporary 
path) for damaged bridges constrained by limited resources to ensure all residents have access to 
hospitals within the shortest time period following extreme events. In Stage III, a multi-objective 
stochastic integer programming problem is built to optimize the schedule of network recovery 
interventions by minimizing the total recovery time (TRT) and maximizing the efficiency (SRT) 
during the recovery period under resource constraints. All these decision problems are NP-hard; 
the NSGA-II and GA are designed to identify near optimal solutions efficiently and are scalable to 
handle large and complex networks.  
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